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Using a stochastic continuous-time Markov
chain model to examine alternative timing
and duration of the COVID-19 lockdown in
Kuwait: what can be done now?
Mustafa Al-Zoughool1* , Tamer Oraby2, Harri Vainio1, Janvier Gasana1, Joseph Longenecker1, Walid Al Ali3,
Mohammad AlSeaidan4, Susie Elsaadany5 and Michael G. Tyshenko6

Abstract
Background: Kuwait had its first COVID-19 in late February, and until October 6, 2020 it recorded 108,268 cases
and 632 deaths. Despite implementing one of the strictest control measures-including a three-week complete
lockdown, there was no sign of a declining epidemic curve. The objective of the current analyses is to determine,
hypothetically, the optimal timing and duration of a full lockdown in Kuwait that would result in controlling new
infections and lead to a substantial reduction in case hospitalizations.
Methods: The analysis was conducted using a stochastic Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC), eight state model
that depicts the disease transmission and spread of SARS-CoV 2. Transmission of infection occurs between
individuals through social contacts at home, in schools, at work, and during other communal activities.
Results: The model shows that a lockdown 10 days before the epidemic peak for 90 days is optimal but a more
realistic duration of 45 days can achieve about a 45% reduction in both new infections and case hospitalizations.
Conclusions: In the view of the forthcoming waves of the COVID19 pandemic anticipated in Kuwait using a
correctly-timed and sufficiently long lockdown represents a workable management strategy that encompasses the
most stringent form of social distancing with the ability to significantly reduce transmissions and hospitalizations.
Keywords: Kuwait, COVID-19, Stochastic model, Lockdown timing, Lockdown duration, Actual incidence,
Hospitalization

Background
On December 312,019, A cluster of viral-related pneumonia cases was identified in Wuhan, China. These
cases were found to be caused by a new respiratory betacoronavirus [1, 2] later renamed to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) [3].
The resulting constellation of respiratory symptoms
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caused by SARS-CoV-2 was given the designation of
COVID-19 (coronavirus disease 2019). Travel related
cases from China seeded outbreaks in several other
countries. The World Health Organization (WHO) declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern on January 30, 2020 [4]. Shortly afterwards, the
number of diagnosed cases increased several-fold and
the number of countries which reported cases increased,
the WHO declared the outbreak as global pandemic on
March 11, 2020 [5].
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During the early phases of a pandemic Public Health
officials must make decision given a high degree of uncertainty. The degree, type and timing of interventions
to reduce the health burden of a pandemic must be applied using a precautionary approach with little epidemiological evidence. Many countries affected by
growing numbers of COVID-19 cases shifted management of the pandemic from contact tracing, travel restrictions and quarantine of case contacts [2] to include
broader population interventions such as public health
communications, social distancing (school closures,
work from home), voluntary quarantines (self-isolation), curfews, limited cross-border or regional travel,
and lockdowns to reduce person-to-person transmission [6].
Social distancing reduces transmission between people
where individuals may be asymptomatic but infectious.
Evidence suggests that social distancing as a strategy can
be effective to attenuate the magnitude of a pandemic
[7]. Social distancing spans a continuum from individuals who voluntarily social distance while interacting in
the community, self-isolating at home, entering hospital
isolation or quarantine, to more complex communitywide quarantines and involuntary lockdowns that enforce major movement restrictions at a population level
[7]. The most stringent form of social distancing is the
use of a community-wide quarantine or “lockdown” that
can be applied to a city, region or entire country as a
way to drastically stop the movement of people.
Mathematical modelling can help inform decisionmaking of lockdowns and provide an evidence base for
rational pandemic management. Herein, we use Kuwait
as a case study to show the effects of different timings
and lengths of hypothetical lockdown scenarios. Kuwait
has a relatively small area and population with unique
demographic characteristics that make it of interest to
model the effects of potential interventions. Using a stochastic Continuous-Time Markov Chain (CTMC) model
we analyzed the effects of lockdown timing in Kuwait
due to COVID-19 with emphasis on the attack rates,
and peak hospitalizations.
In addition, the model investigates the effect of various
hypothetical timings (days before the epidemic peak)
and durations (length in days) of the full lockdown. The
model includes country-specific social contact matrices
[8] and considers environmental transmission parameters. Environmental transmission occurs through coming
in contact with surfaces or fomites that have been
contaminated with the virus. This route of exposure
has been reported with SARS and MERS-CoV-1 viruses previously [9]. A recent report showed that after
application, the SARS-CoV-2 virus remained viable
experimentally in aerosols for 3 h, on copper surfaces
up to 4 h, on cardboard up to 24 h, and on plastic
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and stainless steel up to 72 h (depending on the
amount of inoculum shed) [10].
The main purpose of the current analysis is to investigate hypothetical lockdown scenarios and help to inform
Kuwait’s pandemic management strategy for future
COVID-19 waves.

Methods
Model description

Previously we developed a CTMC model with eight
states to depict the disease transmission and spread of
SARS-CoV 2: susceptible (S), exposed (E), infected but
asymptomatic (A), mildly infected and symptomatic (M),
severely infected, symptomatic and hospitalized (H), detected and quarantined (Q), recovered (R), and dead (D)
(SEAMHQRD-V) [11]. A CTMC can capture the initial
disease dynamics and accommodate the uncertainties involved in the disease transmission process. It is also recommended given the small number of cases usually
encountered during the beginning of an epidemic. The
model also considers the environmental transmission denoted by V (see Fig. 1).
We split the population age groups in to three compartments: children (0–18 years), adults (19–64 year) and
seniors (65 years or older), designated as Nc, Na, and Ns.
We assume an initial random number of individuals in
the E, A, and I compartment given by e_0, a_0, and i_0,
respectively. The probability of transitions of the CTMC,
X(t), from state x to state y (denoted by x → y) in the
interval (t,t + dt) for very small dt is given by
PðX ðt þ dt Þ ¼ yjX ðt Þ ¼ xÞ ¼ r xy dt þ oðdt Þ
The disease transitions in the underlying CTMC
model are occurring according to the descriptions and
rates given in the Appendix-Table 1.

Fig. 1 Schematic digraph of transitions of individuals between
compartments in which transmission and transition rates are
indicated over the arrows. See Table S3 for definition of model’s
parameters. The force of infection Λj is given in eq. (1), which
depend on the environmental contact matrix (CV) and social contact
matrices (C) for school, work, household, and others
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Transmission of infection between individuals is assumed to occur through social contacts that occur at
home, in school, at work, and during other activities
(e.g. shopping). The social contact matrices used in the
CTMC model for Kuwait were adapted from the study
by [8] which estimated age- and location-specific contact
patterns for 144 countries. Perm et al. (2017) extrapolated results from an earlier population-based contact
diaries in eight European countries in the POLYMOD
study using a Bayesian hierarchical model [12]. Here, we
use the resulting five social-contact matrices specific to
Kuwait Ck for k = sc (school), h (household), w (work), o
(other), and v (environment). We define the contact
rates between the three age groups:
0 k
1
C cc Ckca C kcs
C k ¼ @ C kac C kaa C kas A
ð1Þ
C ksc C ksa C kss
The home contact matrix was normalized by the number of household members in each age group [13].
~ defines the contact
A socially altered contact matrix C
rates between the three age groups with social distances
and lockdown, where the column vector, the entries of
~ are defined by
C


X

~ ij ¼ C h þ
C
C kij 1−~
pkj ðt Þ 1−~
pki ðt Þ
ij
k¼sc;w;o

over the course of the epidemic. The second measure is
the total attack rate which is the fraction of people that
contract the disease in an at-risk population over the
epidemic period. The third measure is hospital case load,
defined as the fraction of the total population size that is
hospitalized for COVID-19 treatment at any given time.
Extension of the model and model parameterization

Model assumptions are listed in Table 2 of the Appendix. Also, the list of parameters used in the model, their
description and values is shown in the Appendix-Table 3.
We further use parameter functional of the parameters
to reflect the different disease control and mitigation
measures.
Model calibration

A R0 formula of the CTMC was determined in Oraby
et al. (2020) [11] using an approximation of the CTMC
by a multi-type branching process to be proportional to
the spectral radius (ρ) of a simple transformation of the
~ That is,
contact matrix C.


~ A =ρ
~ M =ρ
1þr ω
1þr ω
R0 ¼ρðBÞ ð1−pÞ
ð2Þ
þp
μA
q þ μM þ γM
where
0



~ v ¼ C v 1−~
pvi ðt Þ
C
ij
ij

ðAndÞ
ðpkc ; pka ; pks Þ

for i and j = c, a, s. The vector
defines the
proportion of those practicing social distances in the
three age groups at the different location types k = sc, w,
o, v, and so degree of adherence to social distancing.
~ki is the government imposed closures
The parameter p
~i based
and enforced stay-home which only takes values p
~ki ðtÞ ¼ pki Ið
on a policy turning points tl, i in a way that p
t 1;i ≥t ≥ t 0;i Þ . During the full lockdown, social contact
matrix outside households is reduced to zero which in
turn leads to increase in household contacts.
The environmental transmission has the component at
time t is Vj for j = c, a, and s, where


~ A;i ðt Þ ¼ ωA 1−~
pvi ðt Þ
ω


~ M;i ðt Þ ¼ ωM 1−~
ω
pvi ðt Þ
and where ωA (ωM) is the number of individuals equivalent to environmental contamination/deposit made by
asymptomatic (mildly infected) individual per place.
Different epidemiological measures and their statistics
are simulated from the CTMC. The first measure of the
actual incidence is defined as the proportion of the
newly infected individuals to the population every day

βc N c
B¼@ 0
0

0
βa N a
0

0
1
1 BN
0
B c
B
A
~
0
CB 0
B
βs N s
@
0

1
0
1
Na
0

0

C
C
C
0 C
C
1 A
Ns

ð3Þ

We use that formula of R0 to calibrate the probability
of transmission to different age-groups. We use a value
of R0 = 6.47 as estimated in Tang et al. (2020) [14] by a
very close model for data from Wuhan city.
We used the tau-leap method [15] to simulate the stochastic CTMC model for 1000 iterations. It is known
that the size of the epidemic has a chance to be zero in
CTMC models [16], which we exclude given that attack
rates cannot, epidemiologically, have a value of zero and
the COVID-19 virus has already demonstrated a significant potential to spread between individuals. Results of
these 1000 simulations are presented in Figs. 3 and 4 as
gray shaded band with the solid line representing the
average of these simulations.

Results
Figure 2 shows the effect of the timing (days before the
epidemic peak) and duration (days of implementation)
of the lockdown on attack rates, and hospitalization. Figure 2a shows that implementation of the lockdown 5–
10 days before the epidemic peak for 90 days duration
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Fig. 2 Mean of percentage reduction in Kuwait of the attack rates and peak of hospitalization for the COVID-19. The bar to the right of the
figures represents percent reduction

was associated with the maximum reduction in attack
rates of about 10%. Figure 2b shows that peak hospitalizations were reduced by nearly 60% when the lockdown
was implemented around 15 days before the peak of the
epidemic, and this lockdown would last for 90 days.
The same figure also shows that implementing the
lockdown that is half as long (45 days) can still achieve
about a 50% reduction in hospitalizations. However, the
timing “window” to start the lockdown to achieve the reduction under the 45-day lockdown is shorter in

duration (3–4 days) and would require more precision to
time the start of the lockdown event compared to longer
lockdown durations.
Thus, hypothetically, a lockdown started 15 days before the epidemic peak for a duration of 90 days would
likely achieve the maximum benefit in terms of
hospitalization case load reduction which is an indicator
of the spread of the virus among vulnerable groups.
We further explored other scenarios investigating the
effects of varying the timing and duration of the full

Fig. 3 The course of the actual COVID-19 incidence in Kuwait if the lockdown starts 5, 10, or 15 days before the peak and lasts for 15, 30, or 45
days. The uncertainty is shown in the gray shaded areas, while the solid black curve shows the mean of the simulation results
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lockdown on the actual infection incidence (Fig. 3) and
on hospital caseload (Fig. 4). Figure 3 shows that implementation of the full lockdown 10 days before the epidemic peak and lasting for 45 days was associated with
one of the best outcomes as it reduced the incidence by
about 47%, and it divided the peak into two smaller
ones. The same scenario of timing and duration was also
highly effective in terms of reducing a hospital’s caseloads by about 46% (Fig. 4).

Discussion
Hypothetical lockdowns to achieve public health benefits

The model results indicated the optimal benefit in
terms of reducing both attack rate and hospitalizations was achieved by implementing a full lockdown
15 days before the peak of the epidemic and for a
duration of 90 days, and to a slightly lesser extent as
short as 45 days. A long lockdown can be associated
with severe economic and psychosocial consequences
[17]. Some of these negative effects from prolonged
isolation can even manifest in children and adolescents [18] as well as vulnerable populations such as
immigrant workers [19]. Reported negative effects
could be severe, including mental health issues, anxiety, and stigma [20], and domestic violence [21]. Indeed, the country-wide lockdown in Italy that lasted
for more than two months resulted several effects
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that ranged from changing in children’s eating habits
[22] to sleep disturbances and mental health issues
such as depression and anxiety symptoms [23]. Countries look to optimize lockdown policies to achieve
pandemic transmission control while at the same time
avoiding major economic and socio-economic downturns. In fact, some countries such as Sweden relied
on voluntary public adherence to health measures as
a way to curb the pandemic [24].
The modeled results also show that implementing the
full lockdown 10 days before the epidemic peak with a
shorter relative duration of 45 days can still achieve a
47% reduction in hospitalizations. This may be considered a more reasonable approach as the duration still reduces the need for hospital beds, and at the same time
would be associated with lower risk of negative socioeconomic and psychosocial effects. Effectiveness of the
lockdown depends on the proper timing of its implementation, which should occur around 2–3 weeks before
the peak of the epidemic. However, prediction of the
epidemic peak is difficult, especially with new and emerging infectious diseases. Contact tracing implemented
earlier in the epidemic in several countries provide better insights into the epidemic peak, which would help in
gauging the perfect timing for implementation of a lockdown. For example, contact tracing can help in predicting the evolution of the COVID-19 infections so that

Fig. 4 The course of the hospital COVID-19 caseload in Kuwait if the lockdown starts 5, 10, or 15 days before the peak and lasts for 15, 30, or 45
days. The uncertainty is shown in the gray shaded areas, while the solid black curve shows the mean of the simulation results
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predictions of the peak of the epidemic becomes easier
[25].
Kuwait implemented a five-phase plan to gradually
ease the full lockdown which was implemented from
May 10 until June 30, 2020. The plan involved gradual
re-opening of restaurants, cafes, shopping centers and
the return to work of government employees with increasing capacity [26]. It seems that the plan didn’t result in a substantial reduction of the reported COVID19 cases, as evidenced by the relatively stable trend of
the epidemic until mid-September 2020 [27]. Kuwait is a
unique country in terms of its demographics. More than
60% of Kuwait population are expatriates and the majority of those are low-skilled migrant workers [28] who
live in crowded conditions [29]. These conditions increase the risk of COVID-19 transmission because large
number of workers typically live in the same room and
share the bathroom, kitchen and utensils. Nadoum et al.
(2014) reported that 14% of migrants in his Kuwait survey had more than 14 roommates in a two-bedroom,
two-bathroom apartment [30]. Furthermore, language
and culture barriers could compromise effective communication of control measures to foreign workers. Stigma
and fear of layoff may have prevented them from reporting any COVID-19 symptoms to their managers.
Altogether, this may have contributed to the stable community transmission observed after the end of the lockdown. The Kuwaiti government implemented a set of
strict intervention measures that included testing and
forced institutional quarantine of arriving travelers, especially after the rapid spread of the pandemic in neighboring countries [31]. Despite these efforts, a number of
clustering events have been reported especially inmigrant neighborhoods with high population density.
Data shows that after lifting the full lockdown and easing restrictions by the end of June, people resumed their
daily shopping activities and migrant workers returned
to their manual labor jobs. Consequently, this resulted
in crowding in shopping areas, especially in high density
migrant neighborhoods. The increased trend of diagnosed cases a few weeks after the lockdown was lifted
supports this notion [32]. The observations described
above along with our results raises the question of
whether implementation of a longer lockdown could
have been more effective in reducing the epidemic curve
in Kuwait.
Hypothetical lockdowns for hospital management and
policy

During the first COVID-19 wave the Ministry of Health
reported an increasing number of critical cases admitted
to hospitals (14 in March, 52 in April, 200 in May and
112 in June) (Government of Kuwait, 2020). Implementing a well-timed 45-day lockdown could, according to
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the model, “flatten the curve” reducing hospitalizations
by about 50% and correspondingly halving the hospital
critical case load. Early reports of critical care patients
estimated two-thirds of these patients required ventilation within a day of ICU admittance [5]. Halving the
number of critical cases at any one time would similarly
ease demand for ICU beds and ventilators by half. A 45day lockdown has the effect of splitting the pandemic
peak in to two smaller peaks while extending the overall
duration of the pandemic wave. This would result in half
the number of hospitalizations and critical cases with
lowered ventilator demand.

Conclusion
During the beginning of a pandemic health officials must
implement an efficient contact tracing system so that
exposed individuals can be quickly identified and isolated. Contact tracing can break the chains of transmission of an infectious disease and is thus an
essential public health tool for controlling infectious
disease outbreaks. Indeed, it has proved effective, especially during early phases of the epidemic [2]. However, once contact tracing capacity is exceeded, public
health officials must shift management to employ and
add other strategies to deal with community transmissions. Maintaining measures post-lockdown such as
strong adherence to good hand hygiene, social distancing in public places, and mask wearing in crowded
areas would be effective public health measures. Also,
individuals with symptoms that resemble those of
COVID-19 should avoid contacting others, especially
the elderly or those with co-morbidities.
Our results show that hypothetical lockdown timing is
critical for its effectiveness. Beginning a lockdown, as in
the case of Kuwait, 10–15 days before the epidemic peak
for 90 days (three months) was associated with the maximum reduction in attack rates of about 10% and a reduced peak of hospitalizations by nearly 60%. Even
though a 90-day lockdown was found to be optimal,
public health officials must consider negative impacts to
the economy and mental health resulting from such a
long lockdown duration. Our model shows that a lockdown of 45 days can still achieve about 50% reduction in
hospitalizations. Thus, hospitals with high surge capacity
(having good infrastructure, sufficient staff, stockpiles of
PPE, adequate ICU, dedicated ventilators, extra cleaning
schedules, and isolation rooms) may allow public health
officials to opt for shorter lockdowns due to their sufficient capacity to deal with increased numbers of expected hospitalizations and critical care patients.
During the first wave of this pandemic, the major
negative economic consequences resulting from implementing a country-wide lockdown raised the concept of
“lockdown fatigue”, and the possibility of replacing this
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with local lockdown. Based on the current results, a
timely implementation of a full-lockdown at local/regional scale that can be “switched on and off” and
moved from on region to another depending on how the
peak is progressing in each region could substantially reduce the outbreak in these “hotspots”.

Conclusion
Experience from Kuwait and a number of other countries has revealed that border closures and air travel restrictions are not sufficient to ultimately prevent disease
transmission as a way to control the pandemic. Evidence
confirms that stay at home orders and other physical
distancing measures including lockdowns have successfully suppressed transmission in many countries [33].
Lockdowns represent and encompass the most stringent form of social distancing with the ability to significantly reduce transmissions if timed correctly and of
sufficient duration. With many countries lifting their
lockdowns and returning to normality, there is a need
for ongoing population-wide responsibility which is critical to reduce transmission events.
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